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RECENT CASES
CRIMINAL LAW-CHANGE OF VENUE-RIGHT OF MISDEMEANANT
TO CHANGE OF VENUE-Defendant was arrested in connection with
a civil rights march in Milwaukee, and while in the custody of
the police was charged with resisting arrest, a misdemeanor pun-
ishable by a maximum of one year in prison and/or a five hundred
dollar fine. Prior to trial he made a motion for a change of
venue, alleging community prejudice. The trial judge denied the
motion interpreting the applicable Wisconsin statute:
If a defendant who is charged with a felony files his affi-
davit that an impartial trial cannot be had in the county, the
court may change the venue of the action to any county
where an impartial trial can be had. . .. I
This was interpreted as denying misdemeanants the right to a
change of venue. Defendant appealed his conviction on the grounds
that the statute as interpreted, limiting change of venue to felonies
was a denial of due process and violative of the equal protection
of the law. Held: The statute was constitutional, both on its face
and as applied in this case, because the felony-misdemeanor classi-
fication was not arbitrary nor unreasonable, and because other
methods besides change of venue were available to insure that the
defendant received a fair and impartial trial. State v. Groppi,-Wis.
2d-, 164 N.W.2d 266 (1969).
Section one of the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution reads:
[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law.... 2
The Constitution also guarantees that:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury .... 3
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment has been con-
strued to require that in all criminal proceedings, trials shall not be
1. WIsc. STAT. ANN. 956.03(3) (Supp. 1969).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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conducted in such a manner as amounts to a disregard of
'that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of
justice,' and in a way that 'necessarily prevents a fair
trial.'
14
The question then becomes, whether a categorical denial of a
change of venue to all misdemeanants is a denial of that funda-
mental fairness.
In a recent Texas case the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held,
under facts almost identical to those in the instant case, that a
statute limiting change of venue to felonies was a denial of due
process because it created the possibility that a trial by a fair
and impartial jury may not be had.5 In other words, the test for
a change of venue as stated by that court is:
Where outside influences affecting the community's climate
of opinion as to a defendant are inherently suspect, the
resulting probability of unfairness requires suitable procedur-
al safeguards, such as change of venue, to assure a fair
and impartial trial.
6
The Court of Appeals further said:
The Irvin v. Dowd line of cases involves capital crimes.
We are of the view, however, that the same constitutional
safeguard of an impartial jury is available to a man denied
his liberty-here two years-for a misdemeanor as for a
felony.
7
For the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, then, it is immaterial
whether the crime is serious or petty, felony or misdemeanor; if
the defendant is to have a trial by jury, the jury must be as free
from prejudice as possible. To achieve this end all available pro-
cedural safeguards, not just one or two, must be extended to every
defendant.
Although the United States Supreme Court has never decided
the particular question raised in the instant case, the Court has
had occasion to consider the necessity of change of venue in cases
involving felonies. In Irvin v. Dowd," the Court was faced with
the question of whether or not an Indiana statute9 limiting a de-
fendant to one change of venue denied the defendant due process
of the law. In holding that the denial of defendants' request for a
second change of venue was a denial of due process, the Court said:
4. Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 605 (1944).
5. Pamplin v. Mason, 364 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1966).
6. Id. at 5.
7. Id. at 7.
8. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
9. IND. ANN. STAT. 1 9-130§ (Burns 1956).
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In essence, the right to jury trial guarantees to the criminally
accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, 'indifferent'
jurors. The failure to accord to an accused a fair hearing
violates even the minimal standards of due process. 10
The Court further said in Irvin that even though the prospective
jurors may say they can disregard pre-trial publicity, if it appears
that the publicity so pervaded the courtroom as to make an im-
partial jury impossible, the court should grant a change of venue
regardless of any procedural statute to the contrary. In other words,
regardless of extensive voir dire proceedings, if it appears unlikely
that an impartial jury can be had, some other option must be
exercised by the court, one of these being change of venue. Obvious-
ly, if an option is to be exercised by the court, it must remain open
to do so.1 '
The thrust of Irvin and its progeny 2 seems to be that due
process requires as a bare minimum that a jury be impartial and
free from prejudice. In order to insure this impartiality it is neces-
sary only to show the probability that prejudice has entered the
jury box. As the Court said in Sheppard v. Maxwell,13 it is not
necessary to show identifiable prejudice; the increase in probability
is sufficient.
If it is true that due process is concerned only with the prob-
ability of prejudice entering the jury box, it would seem to follow
that any practice, procedure, or policy adhered to by a court or
state which increased the probability of prejudice would immediately
be suspect as a denial of due process. In view of the fact that
Wisconsin confers on every defendant in a criminal prosecution
the right to a trial by jury,14 it would seem a fair inference that
in the present case denying the defendant the right to a hearing
on change of venue works as a denial of due process. The prob-
ability of prejudice destroying the impartiality of the jury goes
up as the procedural safeguards against prejudice go down.
10. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961).
11. State v. Groppi, - Wis.2d----, 164 N.W.2d 266 (1969). As the dissent in the in-
stant case points out, even If it is shown at voir dire proceedings that prejudice is ram-
pant in the community, it does not help a misdemeanant, since the statute under the ma-
joritys' interpretation, excludes him from a change of venue regardless of the circum-
stances. All that would be available to him would be a continuance, or allow the trial to
continue and later request a new trial. If the first alternative is chosen the defendant In
effect loses his right to a speedy public trial; if he chooses the second the whole concept
of a fair and impartial trial is meaningless. This situation would certainly meet the test
that the probability of unfairness has increased.
T he dissent also argues that the venue statute is procedural in nature and simply
states the duty of the Judge if prejudide is apparent and the defendant is charged with a
folony. Thus, the dissent says, the statute does not exclude misdemeanants from change
of venue; it merely is silent as to the judges' duty if the misdemeanant requests a change
of venue.
12. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) ; Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
13. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
14. WIS. CONST. art. 1, § 7 (1848).
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Although all of the Irvin line of cases involved felonies, that
fact does not seem to be controlling. The question in each case
was what does the United States Constitution, via the fourteenth
amendment, guarantee a criminal defendant who is being tried by a
jury. In each case the answer was the same: a fair and impartial
jury, with all necessary procedures toward that end. Since, as stated
earlier, all criminal defendants in Wisconsin may have a jury trial
if they wish, the Irvin cases are directly in point. Once a defendant
has requested a jury, he has satisfied all the requirments necessary
to bring himself within the purview of Irvin.15
Despite the Wisconsin courts' argument that change of venue
is only one method of insuring a fair trial, 1 if the other methods
fail as they did in Irvin, it seems hardly logical to say that any
further procedures possible may not be used because the others
should not have failed. It should not be necessary to argue that a
defendant may appeal on the basis that he did not receive a fair
trial. The Constitutions of both the United States and Wisconsin
guarantee a fair and impartial jury, not a fair and impartial ap-
pellate court.
Section one of the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution guarantees that no state shall
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws.
1 7
Unless some rational basis exists to justify it, the distinction made
by the Wisconsin legislature (if indeed the legislature made the
distinction) between felons and misdemeanants for the purpose of
obtaining a change of venue in criminal cases would seem to violate
the equal protections clause.' s
The basis for the Wisconsin courts' justification of the distinction
drawn between felons and misdemeanants seems to be twofold:
(1) Misdemeanors are not the kind of crimes which engender com-
munity prejudice, and therefore change of venue is not a necessary
15. In other words, the difference between the scope of the Irvin cases and that of the
cases exemplified b y Gideon v. Wainwright, 872 U.S. 335 (1962) is simply that those cases
incorporate into their holdings the felony-misdemeanor distinction because they must des-
ignate who is entitled to, for example, effective counsel. The Irvin cases on the other hand
need not make such a distinction. The question is, given a jury trial, what standards must
be followed to insure it be a fair and impartial jury. Accordingly, the Wsconsin court (or
legislature, as the case may be,) by making the felony-misdemeanor distinction is really
saying all criminal defendants are entitled to a trial by jury, but only felons are entitled
to all the guarantees necessary to insure that it be a fair and impartial Jury. This is not
in the spirit of the Irvin cases, and to deny their applicabitity Is to read into their holdings
a caveat not to be found in the cases themselves.
16. State v. Groppi, - Wis.2d- , 164 N.W.2d 266, 270 (1969).
17. U.S. OONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
18. Wis. STAT. ANN. 956.03(3) (Supp. 1969). The Wisconsin court does not seem to
have Interpreted the statute at all in the opinion; they apparently assuone the legislature
intended to restrict the statutes appliotalon to felons.
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remedy; (2) Efficiency in the administration of justice justifies the
distinction drawn, since allowing misdemeanants a change of venue
would bog down the judicial system. 19
The difficulty with the first of these justifications is that the
major premise, that misdemeanors do not engender community
prejudice, simply is not true. Not only do a large number of crimes
normally classified as misdemeanors attract a great deal of pub-
licity, and thus generate community prejudice, 20 but also the person
who commits the offense quite often draws attention to himself
and hence to the crime. A perfect example of this situation is the
present case. Here the defendant was a well-known, and well-publi-
cized, civil rights leader. His activities made good news. Accordingly,
when he was arrested, his arrest received a great deal of attention.
It does not seem too difficult to imagine that the community, the
community from which the jury would be drawn, would rely on
the publicity given the present arrest, along with the knowledge of
the defendant's previous activities, and become prejudiced against
him to a degree that an impartial jury could not be extracted from
the community.
The second justification, that the efficient administration of jus-
tice requires the distinction be drawn, at first glance seems to have
some merit. It undoubtedly would be expensive and time consuming
to grant a change of venue to every person charged with a mis-
demeanor. However, this line of reasoning is subject to at least
three criticisms: (a) Not every misdemeanant will apply for a
change of venue, and thus neither time nor money will be expended
on those cases; (b) Whatever costs are saved by denying the right
to pre-trial hearing will probably nonetheless be incurred in post-
trial proceedings. As the court in the instant case said, the defendant
may request a hearing to determine if he was denied a fair and
impartial trial; 21 (c) Those people who can show they did not
receive a fair trial because of the inability to find an impartial
jury would probably be given a new trial. The costs of the first
trial would have been avoided in those cases if the defendant had
been allowed a change of venue.
Neither of the reasons given to justify the distinction drawn
19. State v. Groppi, -Wis.-, 164 N.W.2d 266, 268 (1969).
20. A good example of a misdemeanor which attracts and creates community prejudice
is Wis. STAT. ANN. 940.29 (1955). This section makes it a crime punishable by a $500 fine
and/or one year in the coubty jail, (a misdemeanor under Wisconsin law), for any per-
son in charge of or employed by any one of a specified number of institutions to abuse,
neglect, or mistreat any inmate of the institution. Anyone charged with, for example, mis-
treating minors in a state reform school would most certainly arouse the wrath of the
community. A change of venue, under present Wisconsin law, would: not be available to
this person regardless of the nature and extent of the prejudice hisalleged crime engen-
dered in the community.
21. State v. Groppi, -Wis.2d-, 164 N.W.2d 266, 270 (1969).
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between felons and misdemeanants seems sufficient to relieve the
charge that the distinction does in fact violate the equal protections
clause.
It seems clear that the Wisconsin statute does in fact serve to
deny to misdemeanants due process, and that the distinction should
be dropped. This is all the more apparent in light of other states'
provisions which generally do not make any distinction between
defendants for the purpose of change of venue. 22  Furthermore,
the trend seems to be toward dropping the felony-misdemeanor
classification for purposes of determining which defendants are en-
titled to such things as jury trial or adequate counsel. 23 Both the
statute and the decision in this case are against the weight of
authority and the principles of justice, and both should be changed.
TERRY M. ANDERSON
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - REMOTE PROXIMATE CAUSE -
ALCOHOLISM CAUSED BY ORIGINAL COMPENSABLE INJURY-Plaintiff
incurred a back injury arising out of and in the course of his employ-
ment at the defendant's plant for which he received the allowable
compensation. Shortly after surgery, plaintiff returned to favored
employment1 at a greater wage than he had received previously.
More than seven years after his return to work the plaintiff was
discharged for being under the influence of intoxicants while at his
place of employment. A claim for workmen's compensation was
submitted contending that there was a causal relationship between
plaintiff's drinking problem and his compensable back injury.2 The
trial court found for the plaintiff and on appeal the Michigan Court
of Appeals affirmed. Scroggins v. Corning Glass Company, 10 Mich.
App. 174, 159 N.W.2d 171 (1968).
The Court of Appeals relied upon the plaintiff's self-diagnosis
that his consumption of alcoholic beverages was to relieve the pain
caused by his back injury. The plaintiff testified that he hadn't
22. ALA. CODE tit. 15, § 267 (1959) ; CAL. PENAL CODE, § 1033 (West 1956) ; GA. CODE
ANN. § 27-1201 (1953) ; IDAO1 CODE ANN. § 19-1801 (1947) ; ILL. REV. STAT. oh. 38, § 114-6
(1963); LA. REv. STAT. § 15:290 (1950); MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 762.7 (194,6) Miss. CODE
ANN. § 2508 (1957); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-15-01 (1960); N.Y.,CODE OF CR. PROc. § 344
(Me-Kinney 1958) ; WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 10.25.070 (1961); State ex. rel. Ricco v.
Biggs, 198 Ore. 413, 255 P.2d 10,55 (1955).
23. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (jury) ; State v. Borst, 278 Minn.
278 Minn. 388, 154 N.W.2d 888 (1967) (counsel) ; Stevenson v. Halzman, --- Ore.-,
458 P.2d 414 (1969) (counsel).
1. A return to a position commensurate with employee's former work both in salary
and status. Scoggins returned as a plant guard.
2. No claim was submitted contending that the type of work contributed to the drink-
ing problem.
